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FEDERAL INCOME TAX: ACCRUAL DATE OF DIVIDENDS
FROM STOCK GIVEN IN AN INTRA-FAMILY TRANSFER
PERHAPS the most common means of economizing on the family tax
bill is to deflect the father's income into the hands of his children who,
having little or no income of their own, are taxed on the deflected in-
come at a rate considerably lower than that which would have been
applied to the income had it been realized by the father.1 However,
there are severe limitations on the success of such efforts. It was early
established that the tax law will disregard the efforts of the taxpayer to
assign the income from his personal services.2 Similarly, a taxpayer
cannot shift the tax liability on income from income-producing property3
by giving away the right to the income unless he also gives the income-
producing property, divesting himself of all the incidents of ownership
before the income in question is earned.4 Even if the donor gives
both the income and the income-producing property, he is none-the-less
taxed on any income earned before the making of the gift. However,
if the cash basis taxpayer is willing to part with the income-producing
'See, e.g., Bishop v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952) 5 Overton v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1944), Mahaffey v. Helvering, i4o F.2d 879
(8th Cir. 1944). Since 1944, income of a child is taxable to the child even if, by the
local law, it is effectively the property of the parent, INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 73, and
even though parents remain liable for any unpaid tax owed by a child, INT. Rav. CODE
OF 1954, § 62o(c).
Before the income-splitting provisions now found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2
were first enacted in 1948, many attempts to split income with the spouse were made
for the same reasons. See generally, Paul, Restatement of the Law of Tax Avoidance
in STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 150-51 (1937). The cases dealing with these
attempts are quite applicable to attempts to deflect income to children. See, e.g., Lucas
v. Earl, 281 U.S. ii (1930).
It is a suggestion of long standing that the spirit of the 1948 amendment be extended
to taxing the entire family as one income-producing unit, see Bruton, The Taxation of
Family Income, 41 YALE L.. 1172 (1932).
' Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. ii x (5 930), the genesis of the now famous horticultural
metaphor which instructs that the fruits of labor are not to be "attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew." See Jones v. Page, 1o2 F.2d 144 (5 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 3o8 U.S. 562 (1939). See also Rev. Rul. 71, 1953-I CUM. BULL. 18.
'Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940)5 Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
355 0939), Comment, 38 MicH. L. REv. 1359 (194o)i Tavares v. Commissioner,
275 F.2d 369 (st Cir. i96o) 5 Bing v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 45o (S.D.N.Y. 1927), aff'd,
26 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1928). See Schlosberg, Income Tax Consequences of the
Assignment or Cancellation of a Leasehold, io TAx L. REV. 257 (.955).
'See generally, Harrown, Helvering v. Horst: Some Recent Applications of the
Doctrine, N.Y.U. 6TH INST. ON FED. TAx 1227 (.948).
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property, and does so before the income thereon is earned, such income
will be taxed to the donees.5
When the income-producing property is corporate stock, the inter-
vention of the artificial corporate entity delays the date upon which a
stockholder realizes taxable income from the time the corporate entity
realizes a gain until the benefit reaches the stockholder in the form of
dividends. However, it has never been dearly established whether
dividends reach the stockholder so as to be included in his gross income
upon the date of declaration of dividends, the date of record, or the
date of payment."
In Smith's Estate v. Commissioner,' two men owned most of the
stock in a closely held corporation. They each gave a considerable
number of shares to certain of their children after the corporation had
declared dividends but before the date of record." The children re-
ceived the dividends and included them in their incomes for that year.
The Commissioner treated the receipt of dividends by the children as
realization of income by the fathers and assessed a deficiency.
The Tax Court' by a very questionable construction of the ap-
plicable state law, ruled that the dividend income had vested in these
taxpayers at the date of declaration.1 The court then found that the
'INT. REa. CODE OF 1954, § ioz(b). The obvious disadvantageous feature of this
means of tax avoidance is that the father completely loses legal control over the income-
producing property and with it, all too often, the respect and obedience of his children.
Commissioner v. Cohen, 1zz F.2d 3 4 8 ( 5 th Cir. 1941), Helvering v. McGlue's
Estate, 119 F.zd 167 ( 4th Cir. 1941), and Estate of Ledyard, 44 B.T.A. io56 (194)
(probably distinguishable on the basis of applicable state law), give some support to
the declaration date arguments. See generally, Annot., 15o A.L.R. 754 ('944).
More impressive authority supports an argument for a later accrual date. Avery v.
Commissioner, 292 U.S. 21o (1934), held that dividends do not become income on
mere declaration, but only when "received," that is, unqualifiedly made subject to the
stockholder's demand as by check. See Treas. Reg. § I.3o1-1(b) (19;5) ; Commis-
sioner v. American L. & T. Co., 156 F.zd 398 ( 7th Cir. 1946); Tar Products Corp.
v. Commissioner, 13o F.2d 866 ( 3d Cir. 1942); Annot., 143 A.L.R. 596 (1943).
:292 F.2d 478 (3 d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 82 Sup. Ct. 438 (1962).
'The company and the commissioner entered into a final agreement on March 25S
1953, establishing the company's liability for the personal holding company surtax and
allowing the company to obtain a credit against the tax and thus to free itself of most
of the deficiency by declaring a deficiency dividend. Electing to take advantage of this
agreement, the directors on April 17, 1953, declared dividends to be paid on May so,
1953, to the stockholders of record on that date. The petitioners gave the stock to their
children on May 9, 1953.
9 34 T.C. 842 (1960).
The Tax Court's underlying premise, perhaps itself open to question, see Estate
of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 393, 395 (1945); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S.
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taxpayers' act of giving away stock upon which dividends had been
declared was an anticipatory assignment of fully-vested income, with
the result that the taxpayers remained liable for the tax. That a stock-
holder receives no right to immediate possession until the date of
record and only then if he has retained the ownership of the stock was
depreciated by the court as "a mere convenience either for their supposed
benefit or for the benefit of the corporation." 1
Clearly, a finding that the taxpayers had a fully-vested right to
these dividends prior to the making of the gift and that the record date
created no real condition' s to their enjoyment of this right was essential
to the relevance of both the commissioner's successful theory of anticipa-
tory assignment"3 and his alternative argument that the taxpayers were
188, 193 (1938), was that the state law establishes the property rights of the parties
and the federal law merely attaches the tax consequences. The successful contention
of the Commissioner was that under the New Jersey law the effect of declaration is to
constitute the corporation as the debtor of its stockholders and thereby to give each
stockholder an immediately-vested right to a future payment of dividends. The taxpayer
contended that the authority the Commissioner cited in support of his view that a stock-
holder's rights to dividends vest at the declaration date were cases in which the declara-
tion failed to provide for a date of record. But granted the correctness of the Tax
Court's construction of state law, the concept of vesting, at least to the extent based
on a finding of the establishment of a debtor-creditor relationship, would not be con-
sidered helpful by the majority of courts. Most courts find that a taxpayer realizes
dividend income only when it is made unqualifiedly subject to his demand. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. American Light & Traction Co., 156 F.2d 398 ( 7 th Cir. 1946).
1% 34 T.C. 842, 844 (196o).
"
2 The situation here is not strictly analogous to an assignment of accrued bond
interest, rents, royalties, etc. These items are taxable to the holder of the income
producing property to the extent the income thereon is earned while held by the donor
without regard to the dates the income becomes unconditionally payable, because, except
for the passage of time, nothing further need be done by the taxpayer to realize income.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). But these items are said to accrue day-by-
day regardless of when they fall due. Dividends do not accrue day-by-day. The stock-
holders have granted power over their investment to the corporate director and have
no right to a return until dividends are declared. Thus, if a bond and all outstanding
interest thereon were given away two days before the interest fell due, two day's interest
would be substracted from the amount of income taxable to the donor. If stock were
given away two days before the rec6rd date established by a prior declaration of dividends,
two day's dividend income clearly could not be subtracted from the donor's gross income.
"' One has made an anticipatory assignment of income when he assigns to another
his vested right to receive income. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.s. 591, 604
(1948). If it were established that the dividends accrued on the date of declaration,
or on some other date prior to the making of the gift, a discussion of anticipatory
assignment would be relevant to explain how it is that a cash basis taxpayer received
taxable income without receiving cash or a cash substitute. But until it is established
that the right to income has vested in the taxpayer, any discussion of anticipatory assign-
ment is premature. It is true that making an anticipatory assignment of income in-
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in constructive receipt'4 of the dividends. Therefore, the Tax Court's
decision can be upheld only by adopting that court's ruling that these
dividends vested at the date of declaration.15 One may question the
relevance of the concept of vesting to a tax law which boasts its lack of
concern with the "attenuated subtleties" of the law of property." With
or without the concept of vesting, however, it is dearly the weight of
authority that dividends do not accrue until the date of record.17
volves the exercise of power over the income and the commanding of its benefits. See
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154. (1942). But it does not follow from this that one
who exercises such power over income has made an anticipatory assignment. See
Bishop v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952). Power over income and
the ability to command its benefits does not depend on vesting. For example, such
power is exercised by a stockholder who transfers his stock before dividends are de-
dared but this exercise of the power to command benefits would not be considered an
anticipatory assignment by any court.
"Constructive receipt is a theory utilized to impose a tax on a cash basis taxpayer
who, in order to delay the realization of income until a subsequent tax year, has de-
clined to accept dominion over income which is, except for some self-imposed condition,
completely within his control. The Commissioner's constructive receipt argument
assumes that the record date is self-imposed and therefore not a real condition to the
donor's inmmediate enjoyment of the dividend income at the time he surrendered
ownership and control of the stock. Such an assumption ignores the very corporate
structure that gives rise to the tax. The taxpayer contended that the record date is not
a condition self-imposed by the taxpayer, but a condition imposed upon the taxpayers
by the corporate entity. See generally Treas. Reg. § 45 1-2 (1957); Commissioner v.
Fox, 218 F.zd 347 ( 3 d Cir. 1954).
"See Harrison v. Schaffner, 32 U.S. 579 (1941), where in speaking of Helver-
ing v. Horst, 311 U.S. 12 (940) and Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. xza (1940),
and failing to make a possible decisive distinction in the facts, the Court said "in
each of those cases it was held that one vested with the right to receive income did not
escape the tax by any kind of anticipatory arrangement, however skillfully devised,
by which he procures payment of it to another, since, by the exercise of his power to
command the income, he enjoys the benefit of the income on which the tax is laid."
312 U.S. at 582 [Emphasis added]. "[O]ne who is entitled to receive, at a future
date, interest or compensation for services . . . realizes taxable income quite as much
as if he had collected the income and paid it over to the object of his bounty." Id. at
580 [Emphasis added].
In all the anticipatory assignment cases, either the event making the income taxable
to the assignor had already happened at the time of the attempt to deflect the income,
Helvering v. Horst, supra; Austin v. Commissioner, x6x F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947);
Annie A. Colby, 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941), or the assignor retained meaningful control
over the income-producing property at least sufficient to affect the amount of income
produced. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) (taxpayers used their control of
the stock as trustees under a trust arrangement for their donecs to maintain their control
over their corporation).
"See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. iii (193o) and note so, supra.
"The Supreme Court in Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 393, 399 (1945), dearly
restated the law in this regard:
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* On appeal, the Court of Appeals -for the Third Circuit- failed to
resolve the dividend accrual date controversy. Rather that court
affirmed the decision for the Commissioner in a totally unsatisfactory
opinion in which it erroneously thought itself bound by the Supreme
Court decision in Helverng v. Horst."8  In that case, the taxpayer had
given bond coupons to his son and the son had cashed them at maturity.
The donor was held taxable on the interest income collected by the son
because the father had retained ownership of the bond, the income
producing property. In the instant case, however, the stock was given
along with the expectancy of income. The court thought that the im-
portance of this factual distinction had been erased by the Tax Court
decision in Estate ofBertha May Holmes.19 There the taxpayer was
found taxable on credited accumulated dividends which she had given
to her children along with the stock. In the Holmes case, like the
Horst case, the income had clearly accrued to the donor before the gift
of income-producing property was made. Only by assuming the cor-
rectness of the Tax Court's questionable finding that the dividends
accrued to the Smith case taxpayers at the declaration date, the very
issue on appeal, can that case be said to be controlled by the Horst
case as modified by the Holmes decision.
The Court of Appeals adverted to Putnam v. Commissioner,20
wherein the Supreme Court held that when the taxpayer dies between
the date of declaration and the date of record, the dividends are in-
cludable in the return filed by the taxpayer's estate rather than the return
filed for the decedent for the last part-year of his life. The court con-
cluded that this authority was not controlling, since it addressed itself
to the question of when the income accrued, rather than to whom it
accrued. It seems, however, that the two questions are inseparable, for
to ascertain to whom income is taxable, one must ask when the income
accrued and then determine the owner of the income-producing property
at that moment. A man's estate is, for tax purposes, a completely
"Earnings, before declaration of dividends, while increasing the value of his stock,
have never been treated as an event to mark taxable income to the stockholder. Mere
declaration of a dividend does not alter the stockholder's interest in the corporate
assets.... The stockholder can acquire no interest in a dividend, amounting to an accrual
under section 42, [Revenue Act of 1938] before the amount of the dividend and the
distributee is determined." [Emphasis added.]
18 311 U.S. 112 (1940). See also Corliss v. Bowers, 2S U.S. 376 (x930) (con-
cerning income-producing property given by a revocable trust).
29 1 T.C. 5o3 (-943).
20 324 U.S. 393 (194-5)-
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separate entity. Therefore no sound distinction can be made between
the legal effect of the movement of stock ownership from a man to
hisdonee and from a man to his estate. Consequently, the practical
effect of such a distinction is to create a new rule as to when dividends
accrue applicable only in a gift context.
Furthermore, though the court thought this departure from the
Putnam rule was dictated by "practical considerations of fairness and
convenience,"' the rule suggested in the Smith case achieves neither
result. The owner of a given share of stock, and thus the person liable
for income tax on any dividends it produces, is more easily ascertained on
the record date than on the declaration date. The dosing of the transfer
books for a period encompassing the record date, for example, though
intended to facilitate the corporation's determining to whom it is liable
for dividends also makes it the more convenient date for the imposition
of the tax.
Moreover, the Third Circuit's rule as to the time when dividends
accrue on donated stock does not thwart tax avoidance, for a controlling
stockholder may still avoid the tax by giving away the stock before he
causes his corporation to declare dividends. Such a rule actually invites
unfairness for it gives a special advantage to those inside persons who
may have advance notice of an impending declaration of dividends.22
Finally, the Commissioner need not be apprehensive of this seeming
tax loophole, for the obvious disadvantage of one's giving away his
property to avoid a tax on it and the fact that this method of avoidance
can be utilized but once for each of a man's possessions, necessarily limits
its threat to the federal revenues to near insignificance.
From the decision it is not altogether clear whether the Court of
Appeals considered itself bound by Helvering v. Horst because of the
supposed parity of the facts, or because of the concept of "taxable satis-
faction" which finds its classic statement in that case. If the latter,
292 F.2d at 480.
22 Complete fairness in this regard can only be achieved by taxing corporate income
to stockholders as it is realized by the corporation. Whether a corporate stockholder
can, under the sixteenth amendment, be taxed on undistributed income is questionable,
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. x89 (1920), not to mention the obvious difficulty of
administrating such a plan.
"Helvering v. Horst, 3x U.S. 112 (1940). In taxing the proceeds from the
redemption of donated coupons to the donor bondholder, the Supreme Court said:
"Even though he never receives the money, he derives money's worth from the disposi-
tion of the coupons which he has used as money or money's worth in the procuring
of a satisfaction which is procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's
[Vol. x962:29i
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it seems unfortunate that the Third Circuit saw fit to breathe new life
into this superfluous doctrine.2"
In assessing the usefulness of the satisfaction concept, it is first neces-
sary to divide the theory into its component parts, "economic satis-
faction" and "personal satisfaction." If each of the taxpayers in the
Smith case had arranged to have the dividends paid to his creditors
in discharge of a debt," to minor children in discharge of his duty of
support,26 or even toward the purchase of a policy of life insurance
payable to his children in performance of his moral obligation to them,7
a real economic gain would have accrued to the taxpayers.2 8 This gain
may be labeled "economic" satisfaction, though a more descriptive
appellation would be "indirect realization of income." If, on the other
hand, the taxpayers had arranged to have the dividends paid to charity
or to a favorite nephew, the gain would be non-material and the satis-
faction purely "personal." Although this dichotomy is not dearly dis-
tinguished in the decisions, satisfaction in the latter sense has never
been used to find taxable income. 9 Furthermore, courts have not used
it in determining whether the donor or donee is taxable on income dearly
taxable to one of them, but rather only to demonstrate the reasonable-
worth. The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of his
acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it would have been if he had
collected the interest in dollars and expended them.... 11 Id. at 117.
"At one time it was widely felt that a satisfaction criterion would have great
utility in simplifying the task of determining the person to whom income is taxable.
But the idea soon lost favor with courts and commentators as producing more problems
than it solved and few regretted its ebbing, see generally, Soll, Intra-Family Assign-
ments: Attribution and Realization of Income, 6 TAx L. REv. 435 (.95.).
"U.S. v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 279 U.S. 732 (1929); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); cf. U.S. v. Mahoning Coal Railroad Co.,
51 F.zd 208 (6th Cir. 193). See, U.S. v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931 )
Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
38 Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U.S. 551 (935) (per curiam); Douglas v. Willcuts,
296 U.S.'1 (.935) (in discharge of duty to pay alimony). See, Anthony's Estate v.
Commissioner, 155 F.2d 980 (xoth Cir. 1946). The relevant section today is INT.
REv. CODE OP 1954 § 677(b).
"Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (x933) (Cardozo J.).
2" "[E]conomic gain realized or realizable by the taxpayer is necessary to produce
a taxable income . . . . ," Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, x68 (1942), wherein
it was held that the creator of a trust for his daughter is not taxable on the income
produced by the trust even though it "would satisfy the normal desire of a parent to
make gifts to his children."
" See generally, Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments to Avoid Federal
Income Tax, 64 YALE L.J. 991 (1955).
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ness of their imposition of -the tax upon the donor under some -other
rationale.30
In the Smith case, the donees were adult children toward whom the
donors had no duty of support. Accordingly, the donor's satisfaction did
not take the form of economic gain, but was a purely personal
satisfaction. If the Court of Appeals is urging that personal satis-
faction is suffident in itself to cause the dividends to be taxable to the
donors, the rule of the case is administratively unmanageable 1 and if
applied consistently would be greatly disruptive of our tax laws.3 2 If on
the other hand, the court employed personal satisfaction as a corrobora-
"o Indeed, the satisfaction doctrine found its first expression in Burnet v. Wells, 289
U.S. 670 (1933), where the Supreme Court sought to demonstrate that a tax, incon-
trovertibly imposed upon the petitioner by the statute, was not, as claimed, so arbitrary
as to be an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law.
"' If satisfaction really were the test of what person is taxable on income, the court
need not have concerned itself with the declaration date any more than it did with
the record date. The taxpayer would receive equal satisfaction from assigning stock
with a sizable surplus available for distribution as he would from assigning stock upon
which dividends had been declared. Conversely, if the Treasury were to attach income
tax consequences to the feeling of a "twang" of satisfaction, how would it tax a man
who was in a coma when his corporation declared and paid dividends and who did not
awaken until his next fiscal year? Would this be "constructive" satisfaction?
Or, assuming the reasonableness of a taxable satisfaction theory, should the realiza-
tion of income come to the donor upon the making of the satisfying gift or upon
otbaining the satisfaction of seeing the donee receive the benefit, i.e. when the dividends
are received? In the Smith case, the court apparently thought taxable satisfaction
occurred at the making of the gift. In Commissioner v. Timken's Estate, 141 F.zd
6z5 (6th Cir. 1944), the taxpayer gave to a charity certain notes upon which the
debtor had not nor could not pay the interest accrued or to accrue. The court held
that no tax was incurred by the taxpayer at the time of the gift (or, for that matter,
when the debtor eventually paid off the notes, for by then, said the court, the charity
was the full owner). Cf., Helvering v.. Eubank, 311 U.S. 1zz (1940); Anthony's
Estate v. Commissioner, x55 F.zd 98o (oth Cir. 1946); Annie A. Colby, 45 B.T.A.
536 (1945).
' Such a use of a satisfaction concept would, if applied consistently, seem to demand
the levying of a tax on the satisfaction flowing to a homeowner upon the enjoyment of
his house (as is done in England). To attempt this would raise serious constitutional
questions. See Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 37M 379 (1934)
(dictum).
And would not the same satisfaction accrue to one who gives property greatly en-
hanced in value (as stocks in a corporation which has accumulated a substantial earned
surplus or farm products which have had a tax free maturation) is given to charity?
But it seems to be settled at last that the giving away of property does not produce tax-
able income. Cambell v. Prothro, 209 F.zd 351 (Sth Cir. 1954); Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C.
459 (1954) (land given away one week prior to harvest of wheat crop worth
.$5o,0oo,oo); Estate of W. G. Farrier, x5 T.C. 277 (195o) (rejecting I.T. 3932,
1948-2 Cum. Bull. 7).
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tive justification for its holding that the income accrued at the declaration
date, the use of personal satisfaction only beclouds the real issues. When
the income-producing property is given with the income, the only real
issue is whether the income accrued before or after the making of the
gift.
The Commissioner's position in the Smith case had unusual appeal
because the transfer in question was obviously a mere shifting of wealth
within the taxpayers' families in an effort to minimize the tax on divi-
dends allowed by the Service as a credit against a personal holding
company surtax assessment. Perhaps some special provision should
be added to the Internal Revenue Code to deal with this manner of
avoiding a tax on deficiency dividends or to deal with tax avoidance by
intra-family transfers in general. In any event, the resolution of this
problem should not be attempted by the manipulation of such concepts
as taxable satisfaction, anticipatory assignment, or constructive receipt.
Clearly, adopting the declaration date as the date upon which dividend
income accrues would not appreciably lessen this manner of tax avoid-
ance. The most convenient date for affixing income tax liability and the
date best supported by reason and precedent is the date of record.
" The facts are summarized at note 8 supra.
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